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THE NECESSITY FOR CONSERVATISM IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF PATENT LAW.
[READ BEFORE THE PATENT CONGRESS AT CHICAGO, 1893.]
Every system of law is developed by the application of prin-
ciples to facts. The principles are fundamental truths of the
intellectual or moral' order which are perceived by the human
mind, and affirm themselves to the enlightened reason of every
individual. The facts are beings or conditions or relations which
exist in the visible or invisible world around us, and constitute or
influence the personal, social or political life of all mankind. The
proper application of these principles to these facts results in the
creation of new beings, in the production or modification of con-
ditions, and in the establishment or severance of relations,
whereby the sphere of human activity is enlarged, the freedom
and effectiveness of human effort are increased, and the prosperity
and happiness both of the citizen and the community are secured.
The principles of law and the facts to which they are applied
are alike definite and immutable. Neither their scope nor their
verity depends upon the qualities of the applier or upon his act of
application. The fundamental truths are true, both in their com-
prehensions and their limitations, whether or not he perceives
them, or understands them, or adequately interprets and employs
them. The facts are precisely what they are, both in their
essence and their attributes, irrespective of his ignorance or
knowledge, and are unchangeable either by the errors of his
intellect or by the perversity of his will. Even where the facts
are created by the law, when once created they are, as to all
future applications of these principles, no less real and impregna-
le than those which are evolved by physical forces or rest upon
the original fiat of Omnipotence.
The administration of the law, which consists in the proper
application of principles to facts, thus demands in its administra-
tor: first, a clear conception of the principle in its entire compre-
hension and in its exact limitations; second, an accurate appre-
hension of the facts as they really exist; third, a correct percep-
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tion of the relations which subsist between the principle and the
facts, and of the extent and method of the additions, modifications,
or rescissions which it imposes on them; and fourth, an unalterable
fidelity to the truth of the principle and the reality of the facts in
imposing such additions, modifications, and rescissions. In the
administration of the law there is, therefore, no room for the
exercise of the imagination or for the indulgence of individual
idiosyncrasies. The applier of the principle has nothing of his
own to offer by which he can improve or fortify it; nor can he
increase or diminish the smallest detail of the facts by any con-
jecture of his fancy or any falsehood -of his tongue. The duties
which devolve upon him'lie within the province of his intellect alone.
He is bound to know, not to guess; to accept, not to invent; to
become the instrument through which the abstract truth acts upon
the concrete truth in begetting other and equally immutable
truth, not the originator and promulgator of notions conceived in
his own ignorance, and through his pride and folly foisted off
upon the public as the infallible utterance of the law.
Law is administered, for the most part, either by legislatures
or by courts. The legislative body contemplates the beings, con-
ditions, and relations which exist in the community at large, ascer-
tains the principles whose application to these facts is calculated
to promote the public welfare, and makes the application by the
enactment of a statute which is enforced by the executive depart-
ment of the State. The courts inform themselves concerning the
beings, conditions, and relations which constitute the facts in con-
troversy, discover the principle in obedience to which additions,
modifications, or rescissions in the facts should be made, and apply
that principle by ordering and compelling such action or forbear-
ance as the principle demands. The purpose and the process in
both cases is the same. The field of legislative energy is wider.
Its mandate has superior authority. But in their respective
spheres each deals with facts and principles over whose truth and
reality it has no control, yet which, if it is fully cognizant of their
actual character and relations, it can apply, the one to the other,
to the benefit of the entire community or of that part of it to
whom the facts especially pertain.
Conservatism in the administration of the law consists in the
adhesion of the legislative or judicial mind to the entire truth of
principles and to the complete reality of facts, and in its percep-
tion and enforcement of the exact relations which subsist between
them. Conservatism is a term employed sometimes as an antith-
esis of progress, sometimes as an antithesis of ,radicalism. In the
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latter sense only can it be predicated of the administration of the
law. The law is in its very essence progressive. By the devel-
opment of individuals and of society new facts are constantly
evolved and principles hitherto unperceived are made apparent;
and in the application of one to the other courts and legislatures
must keep pace with the movement of mankind. Conservatism,
in the sense of rest or stasis, is therefore impossible. Immutable
as are the fundamental truths to which the legal mind adheres, the
facts to which they are to be applied pour forth in ever increasing
multitudes from the womb of time, and their subjection to these
truths requires the formulation of new rules and doctrines which
reach beyond, but do not contradict, the old.
Conservatism in law is the antithesis of radicalism. Radicalism
is essentially destructive. It overthrows in order that it may
rebuild, but having overthrown it leaves its field of operations
strewn with ruins; and if new structures ever do appear they are
erected by conservatism on the old foundations, with the old
materials, and after the model of those which were destroyed. In
the administration of law radicalism manifests itself in the aban-
donment or contradiction of principles, in the ignoring or perver-
sion of facts, in the substitution of individual opinions for univer-
sal truths, and in the assertion of the transient prejudice or whim
of judge or legislator in place of the inevitable conclusion which
follows from the proper application of indisputable principles to
established facts. Unconscious that one vital force pervades the
universe and that nothing can exist which does not draw its life
from that which lived before it, the radical seeks to cut loose from
the past, and to create by his mere human edict a new cosmos
whose laws and methods shall accord with his own vagrant theo-
ries and perverse desires. Conservatism, on the contrary, recog-
nizes and accepts the "Isness of the Is." The conservative sub-
mits his intellect to the immutable truth of fundamental principles.
He acknowledges that facts are precisely what they are, and in
his own convictions affirms the indissoluble relations between
principles and facts. Whether legislating for the future or solv-
ing the problems of the present, he realizes that in existing insti-
tutions are the seeds of all that are to come, and that whatever
circumstances may arise they can be beneficially and permanently
controlled only by extending to them the same principles which
heretofore have governed our political and social life. Through-
out the history of jurisprudence these two antagonistic influences
have contended for the mastery over the administration of the
law. Fortunately conservatism has thus far prevailed; and not-
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withstanding some portentous revolutions, we can trace back the
great outlines of our legal system to the beginning of the world,
and demonstrate from the experience of every age the truth of its
principles and the practical wisdom of the rules in which their
application has resulted.
Until the present century radicalism in the administration of
the law has perverted the acts of legislatures rather than of courts.
Legislative assemblies too often echoed the temporary wishes of
the sovereign or answered the clamor of the populace by statutes
which embodied no fundamental principle and were adapted to no
actual condition of facts. Meanwhile the courts, having no guide
but the unerring maxims and definitions of the law as interpreted
by their own reason and the concise judgments of their predeces-
sors, referred their decisions back to these ancient standards and
sought only to discover and establish between them and the facts
their necessary and unchangeable relations. The doctrine "stare
dedsis" held them fast to the adjudicated points of previous cases
and under its direction, in spite of hostile legislation, they
advanced with no uncertain or interrupted step, developing the
symmetrical and enduring fabric of the common law. Within the
present century, however, the attitudes of courts and legislatures
have been in this respect reversed. Radicalism has transferred
its theatre of operations from legislative halls to the temple of
justice, and now exhibits itself with greater frequency and more
effectiveness in the decisions of the judges than in the positive
enactments of the written law.
The causes of this double change are easily discerned. The
members of our legislatures have ceased to be the servile instru-
ments of royal will. More deliberate modes of legislation coun-
teract the influence of popular excitement, afford an opportunity
for public discussions through which a thorough acquaintance with
the facts and principles is gained, and enable the legislators
to embody in their edicts the collective wisdom of the State.
Thus in the absence of personal interest and partisan fanaticism
modem legislation is generally conservative, developing the law
along lines predetermined by its past conditions, and meeting the
demands of an advancing civilization with rules of action derived
from the same sources which furnished those under whose impulse
that civilization was itself evolved.
The opposite tendency of judicial administration can be
explained with equal ease. Through the vast increase in com-
mercial enterprises and the industrial arts the sphere of facts has
been expanded out of all proportion to the sphere of human knowi
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edge. A hundred years ago an energetic student might aspire to
some degree of familiarity with all those beings, conditions, and
relations which constitute the practical side of political and social
existence. A lawyer or a judge who did not comprehend the
matters in controversy might justly be charged with a neglect of
duty, and an erroneous decision could proceed only from some
departure from the acknowledged principles or from a voluntary
ignorance of the disputed facts. But this parity between the
knower and the knowable has long since disappeared. No man
can now pretend to universal knowledge, and few to an acquaint-
ance with all the details of any special science. Probably there is
no human intellect which could to-day form an exact and complete
conception of every fact already discovered and verified by men,
even although the fact were fully set before it by the descriptions
and explanations of those who comprehend it. Yet these innu-
merable facts, in every possible combination, are presented to our
courts as one element in the problems which they are compelled
to solve, and our judges are incessantly confronted with questions
requiring a thorough knowledge of subjects which they are qual-
fled neither by natural aptitude nor artificial training to under-
stand, and of which they can gain but the most fragmentary and
deceitful glimpses through the testimony of witnesses and the
arguments of advocates. Thus, though their minds were pervaded
by those fundamental truths which are the reason of the law, it
would be impossible for them to perceive and postulate their true
relation to the facts as they actually exist, and so establish rules
and doctrines in harmony with principle and with the normal
development of the law.
But, most unfortunately, these fundamental truths are also
often dim and shadowy in the judicial mind. For at least two
generations the study of principles has been largely superseded,
both among lawyers and judges, by the hasty examination of
authorities. Instead of resorting for guidance to the supreme
reason of the law, (which is neither the private reason of any man
nor the aggregated reasons of all men, but the universal reason
of mankind "gotten by long study, observation, and experience"),
they fly to some favorable decision in which too often the tribunal
has shown itself wiser than the law, and written its own refutation
in its contradictions of imperishable truth. The modern fashion
of requiring the judges of our courts of last resort to disclose and
publish their reasons for their judgments intensifies this evil in
the highest degree. It does not follow that because the relations
between principles and facts are clearly perceived by the mind
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they can be recited by the tongue. The verdict of a jury, for
example, may be correct, as it sometimes is, and still not one
member of the panel may.be able to describe the mental process
through which the conclusion was attained. No doubt many an
ancient jurist who discerned the principles, and properly applied
them to the facts in a decision which has been endorsed by every
subsequent tribunal, would have made but a sorry showing if be
had undertaken to depict the operations of his own intellect in
reaching the result. The frequent contrast between the rectitude
of a judgment and the weakness of the reasons which are adduced
in its support is thus no matter for surprise, even in cases where
the opinion truly represents the method by which the court arrived
at its conclusions. But when the court has jumped to its conclu-
sion, perhaps under the guidance of a legal instinct more reliable
than all its reasonings, and then attempts to justify its judgment,
the opinion becomes a mere partisan argument, influenced by the
same prejudices and subject to the same dangers of prevarication
and suppression Is if the writer were seeking at the bar the adju-
dication which he now endeavors to defend. Such in their real
and necessary character are many of the decisions upon which so
much judicial labor is expended, and over which so many eager
students pore in the vain effort to discern the sunlight in the
uncertain mirror of this agitated sea.
Moreover, as though this substitution of authorities for princi-
ples would not sufficiently disturb the natural growth and progress
of the law, the authorities themselves have been flagrantly abused.
If, in referring to authorities, cases identical with the one at bar or
truly analogous to it were alone regarded, if due distinction were
made between the points adjudicated and the arguments which
support and the illustrations which explain them, and if only the
judgments of the courts were taken as a guide, the investigation
might be profitable. But when, as often now occurs, the entire
printed opinion is treated as an infallible oracle of the law, when
its ill-considered dicta or its misstated examples are accepted as
settled rules and definitions or as a basis for further logical deduc-
tions, nothing but contradictions and confusion could result.
Instances of this abuse of the authorities are met on every side.
No one can study a subject, by reading in chronological order the
decided cases which involve it, without perceiving how the law
has suffered from this evil. Some of the most dangerous errors,
affecting not merely the theory of the law but immense practical
interests, have had their origin in a heedless sentence, written by
a hurried judge, which had no possible connection with the points
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he was deciding, and of whose legal consequences, if not of its
actual meaning, he was himself unconscious. The more destruct-
ive in their effects, the more subversive of fundamental princi-
ples, such utterances are, the more do they attract and fascinate
certain classes of judicial (?) minds, and the eagerness with which
they are adopted and asserted is equalled only by the ruthlessness
with which they are applied. In view of these abuses it might
well be questioned whether judicial legislation was not in a health-
ier condition, and our tribunals of last resort of more real advan-
tage to the commonwealth, when their judgments on the points in
controversy alone were disclosed and -their reasons, if they had
any, were buried among the secrets of their own breasts.
In the judicial administration of the law according to such
methods, radicalism is of course inevitable. When principles
recede beyond the sphere of judicial vision and facts never com-
pletely come within it, it is impossible that new and strange doc-
trines should not be asserted and that fancy, ignorance, and self-
conceit should not combine to overthrow the rules which embody
the reason and the life of the law. That the decisions of different
courts on precisely similar states of fact should flatly contradict
each other, that courts should overrule their own prior judgments,
that judges should in subsequent opinions exhaust their ingenuity
in endeavoring to explain away the assertions and reasonings of
their previous dissertations, that the whole body of the law should
fall into uncertainty and conjecture, and empiricism usurp the
thrones of knowledge and true scientific investigation, are merely
symptoms and consequences of the radicalism which is fast poi-
soning the very fountains of public justice and undermining those
institutions on which the security and value of political and social
life depend.
It might perhaps have been expected that patent law would
escape this contamination. Its principles are few and eminently
intelligible. All its facts lie within a limited domain capable of
exploration by any person interested in them. Its administration
is entrusted to courts and legislatures presumably composed of
men of the highest practical wisdom and widest experience, and
actuated by no motive except the desire to interpret and apply the
lav according to its true spirit and for the mutual benefit of indi-
viduals and the commonwealth. Under these circumstances, this
department of our jurisprudence might well be considered safe
from the insidious attacks of radicalism, and destined to preserve
its integrity, consistency, and usefulness as long as the patent
system should itself endure.
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To a great extent this expectation has been realized. The
legislative administration of the law has almost uniformly been
faithful to principles, though sometimes more than liberal in their
application in favor of inventors. The Statute of Monopolies
declared with clearness and precision the fundamental truths of
patent law, and from its date to the present no original enactment,
either in England or the United States, has materially departed
from them. The same encomium may be awarded to the author-
ized amendments, compilations, and revisions, when these are
construed by the originals in obedience to the common law rules
of statutory interpretation.
The judicial administration of the law is not entitled to an
equal commendation. The attitude of courts toward inventors
may be historically divided into three distinct periods,-the first
-ending with the eighteenth century; the second terminating in
this country about twenty years ago; the third that of our own
generation, whose close none can foresee. During the first period
the English judges did not appreciate the importance of the indus-
trial arts nor commend the policy of conferring on inventors a
temporary monopoly in return for their disclosures to the public,
and consequently in their decisions they did not always extend to
patentees that measure of protection which the principles of patent
law require. In the second period the judges of the courts of the
United States, and generally those of England, recognized the full
significance of these principles, and so far as their imperfect con-
ceptions of the nature and results of the inventive act permitted,
correctly applied them to the facts. During this period the opin-
ions of these courts in patent cases are almost entirely free from
the defects which have subjected judicial opinions in other
departments of the law to such abundant and deserved criticism.
While these opinions are not, and do not purport to be, complete
statements of the doctrines which the judgment is intended to-
enforce, and do not attempt to lay foundations for inferences in
future cases outside the legal points which they expressly deter-
mine, yet as essays upon various topics of patent law, as explana-
tions of its principles and illustrations of their application and
effects, as definitions of the subjects which they govern, as indica-
tions of the questions still unanswered and suggestions of their
probable solutions, they form a body of legal literature which has
no parallel in our jurisprudence and whose loss would be irrepar-
able. In it the student, the lawyer, and the judge, whatever stat-
utes may be passed or text-books written, must ever find the most
fruitful field for their investigations not only of the principles
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which embody the reason of the law, but of the nature and rela-
tions of the facts to which those principles apply.
It is to be profoundly regretted that in the present period the
judicial administration of patent law in this country seems to be
departing from these wise and just standards and trending back-
ward toward the ideas and methods of the preceding age. The
current of judicial feeling is apparently turning against the
inventor, and a jealousy of his exclusive privileges has begun to
manifest itself in narrow interpretations of his patent, in disphr-
aging the achievements of his genius, in imposing upon him
unprecedented burdens of knowledge and diligence, and in depriv-
ing him of benefits and immunities which had long been regarded
as indisputable. Already two of the most important of the funda-
mental principles of our law have been attacked, and others of
less moment, but still essential to the harmony and completeness
of our system, have been put in jeopardy. These attacks have
been as subtle as they were dangerous, and probably were unsus-
pected by the very judges through whose decisions they were per-
petrated. A glance at the invasions of these principles will
disclose the method of those attacks and the magnitude of the
injury which they have already inflicted, not only upon individual
patentees but upon the perspicuity and consistency of the law
itself.
The fundamental truth upon which all patent systems rest is
this: that public policy requires that an inventor who is willing to
place his invention at once within the knowledge of the public, in
consideration of a temporary monopoly therein, should be pro-
tected in the full enjoyment of that monopoly during the period
for which it was conferred. Patent systems exist solely for the
purpose of according and securing this protection. Every rule
regarding the grant and amendment and interpretation and
transfer of patents was made only to bestow upon the inventor the
recompense which he has earned by his disclosure of the invention.
Upon him is imposed a single duty,-to publish his invention in
the description of his patent in such a manner that persons skilled
in the art can, without further exercise of inventive genius, prac-
tise it in the best method known to the inventor. When the
inventor has performed this duty it remains for the public to
carry out effectively its own part of the contract. It is obliged to
grant him a patent in terms which fully cover his invention. If
his first patent does not accomplish this, it must grant him
another, either as a new original or as an amendment of the
former, and repeat its efforts until it does vest in him the monop-
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oly to which he is entitled. In all controversies between him and
itself or other individuals it is bound by the same principle to
construe his patent, if its language will permit, in such a manner
as to coincide with his actual invention, and if its language will
not suffer this, to amend the language in accordance with the facts
and then sustain the monopoly as thus defined. If it is for his
interest to transfer his invention in whole or in part to others, the
right to make such transfer, which enters into the essence of
every property right, must be conceded, and modes must be
provided in which it can be accomplished without other restric-
tions than the nature of the property has imposed. All acts for his
protection are thus acts of the government on behalf of the public
and in the performance of a public obligation, and for the mode
of their performance the public, not the inventor, is responsible.
The statement and allowance of the Claim in which the limits
of his monopoly are defined is the act of the government, and if
this is defective the fault is that of the government, and when
discovered should be corrected without inflicting upon him any
loss or hardship. The grant of a patent is an act of the govern-
ment formulating a judgment, after due inquiry, in favor of the
patentability of his invention and of his title to it as its inventor,
and by this act and its results the government should stand,
affirming the monopoly until its lawfulness is' overwhelmingly
disproved. The construction of a patent by the court is an act of
the government interpreting its own grant, and the court should
interpret the words in the "most liberal and beneficial sense," for
the honor of the public is more to be regarded than its profit, and
it was not the government's intent to make a void grant. The
vindidation of a patentee against infringers is an act of the gov-
ernment enforcing its decrees against impugners of its own
authority and compelling their obedience to regulations which it
has itself imposed, and should be performed with the same
energy, and with as slight respect for the excuses and subterfuges
of wrong-doers, as any other act of prosecuting and punishing
offenders. All these propositions are contained-within that funda-
mental principle of patent law. They follow from it as inevitable
consequences. If it is to remain the corner-stone of our patent
system and the expression of our public policy, then these, and
each of these, must be in its full integrity maintained. For when
they are attacked the whole fabric of our patent jurisprudence is
assailed. When any of them fall, its foundations and its super-
structure are alike endangered.
The instances in which our courts, during the last twenty
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years, have either directly or by implication denied these propo-
sitions are very numerous. No one can read the cases involving
the validity and scope of reissues, the construction of Claims, the
line of demarcation between mechanical and inventive skill, the
weight of the presumptions arising from the grant of a patent,
and similar questions, without perceiving the discrepancy between
the present positions of our courts and those of their predecessors
by whom this principle of patent law was constantly acknowledged
and enforced. That patents cannot be reissued to amend the
Claims in the interest of the inventor; that acquiescence in a
Claim forced on him by the government, as the sole alternative to
the denial of a patent, deprives him of the right to an amendment
even although the Patent Office has discovered and is willing to
correct its error; that the invention protected by the patent is to
be measured by the letter of the Claim notwithstanding it omits or
covers features which the description clearly shows should be
rejected or included in order to confer a monopoly commensurate
with the actual invention; that there is no distinction between
mechanical and inventive skill which can be accurately defined;
that the opinion of a judge, whose knowledge of the industrial arts
has been acquired by hearsay on the bench, is to outweigh that of
skilled governmental experts in the Patent Office upon questions
of the state of the art or the originality and identity of inventions;
that all the rights and remedies of inventors are to be determined
by the phraseology of statutes without referring them to princi-
ples or the doctrines of the common law ;-these are some of the
strange heresies which this later age of judicial administration has
evolved, and in them is the prophecy of worse to come.
The second principle to which I have alluded is the following:
that the first conceiver of an invention, if diligent in reduction, is
entitled to a patent for it against a rival inventor as well as
against all the world. This principle lies at the very heart of our
own patent system, and probably no judge could be found so rash
as to deny it in express words. But nevertheless a doctrine has
crept into our courts, and, found endorsement in the highest
tribunal of our land, which strikes at the life of this principle and
limits it to an extent which practically destroys its value. The
ancient statutory rule that an inventor forfeits his right to obtain
a patent, if with his consent and allowance the invention has been
in public use or on sale for more than two years before his
application, has, under a construction of the Act of i87o which
utterly ignores its antecedents and its consequences, been held to
embrace cases not merely where the invention made by the appli-
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cant had been used without his knowledge, but where the
invention used was that of an unknown and later rival. Obvi-
ously if the public use of an unknown rival invention can defeat
the right of the first conceiver to a patent it is no longer true that
diligence in reduction, added to priority of conception, completes
his title to the patent. The further obligation, and one often
impossible of performahce, is imposed upon him of reducing to
practice and filing his application within two years from his con-
ception, at the risk of losing his monopoly through the action of
some later conceiver but more prompt reducer. The imposition
of this obligation is justified by none of the principles of patent
law, and the inventor is' thus liable to be robbed of the fruits of
his inventive genius without his own fault and while he is. fulfill-
ing every requirement which in reason, or on principle, or under
any consistent interpretation of the letter of the law, could be
exacted from him.
The source of these and of most other departures from the
-principles of patent law has been already indicated. They orig-
inate in the opinions of the judges, mainly in obiter dicta thrown
-off from a rapid pen with little apprehension of their true meaning
and their probable effects. Advocates eager for authorities to
support a doubtful argument in an almost hopeless case are only
too glad to avail themselves of any endorsement of the bench, and
careless whether their quotations represent the judgment of the
court, or its mere reasons and examples, insert these dicta in their
briefs and offer them as judicial statements 'of the law. Too often
the sound of the sentences in which these errors are contained is
.agreeable to the ear. Their very heterodoxy also excites interest,
and in the moderm mind a disposition' to sustain them, and when
other influences are at work upon the court in favor of the advo-
cate it is not surprising that these dicta should be accepted as
expressing verities of law.
The seeds of such errors are still being sown with an unsparing
hand. Not long since one of our courts in discussing the signifi-
cance of 'the word "invention" said: "The word cannot be
defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in deter-
mining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the
inventive faculty or not." If this statement were correct the patent
system would be incapable of administration and the patent law
itself a solemn farce. As no valid patent can be granted except
for an invention, if the nature and attributes of an invention
cannot be ascertained and accurately defined it never can be
known whether the claimant is entitled to a patent or whether an
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existing monopoly should be sustained. To judge the character
of the alleged invention from its consequences does not solve the
difficulty, for if its character cannot be known its relations to other
things are equally unknowable, and though events may follow it
in order of time it never can be safely predicated as their cause.
But the statement is not correct. The word invention is as capable
of exact definition as any scientific term in the English language,
and the processes of the inventive act can be described as clearly
as any other operation of the human mind and hand. That
judges find many states of fact to which the application of this
definition is not easy is also true, but the trouble springs not from
the definition but from their own ignorance of the industrial arts,
and of the proper method of distinguishing the old from the new.
Given a perfect knowledge of the state of an art and a precise
conception of the intrinsic character of an alleged invention, and
the question whether inventive skill was exercised in its produc-
tion becomes one of the simplest problems ever presented to a
court for its solution. What may result from this new blow at
fundamental principles, when the error of this court comes to be
applied in 'other cases through the misdirected ingenuity of
counsel, imagination stimulated by experience can alone con-
ceive.
In a case still more recent the same court has decided that the
Claims of a patent can;not be separately assigned, and advanced as
its reason for the decision that such an assignment would divide
the monopoly otherwise than territorially, contrary to the settled
doctrine of the law. This reasoning assumes that the monopoly
created by a patent is commensurate with the patent, not with the
invention; that if a patent covers several inventions, as under our
system is permissible, the single indivisible monopoly applies to
them as a group, not individually; and that the union thus verb-
ally established between the inventions is disseverable. The
doctrine here asserted is not only new and contrary to the very
meaning of the word monopoly, but introduces into our law
peculiar difficulties. Its logical developments cannot be conjec-
tured. It may compel the owner of a patent covering several
inventions to procure its reissue in divisions in order to assign
them separately, or it may lead some other court, following
another line of deductions, to declare that a reissue in divisions is
a severance of the monopoly Which the law does not allow.
There was no occasion in the case referred to for any allusion to
Jhis subject of monopoly. That public' policy forbids such a
confusion of the records as would be likely to occur if Claims were
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individually assignable was a sufficient reason for the judgment,
and the insertion of this further proposition,-unnecessary,
strange, subversive as it is,-presents a striking illustration of the
pernicious practice which is here condemned.
Instances of these dicta and of their abuse might be indefinitely
multiplied, but it is not the purpose of this paper to criticise the
utterances of the courts, and they have been referred to merely as
exhibiting the infusion of the radical virus into our patent law,
and disclosing the methods in which its influence is disseminated.
There can remain no doubt, after considering these examples, that
the evil exists, that it is propagating itself through the medium of
judicial decisions, and that it threatens to overthrow the very
foundations of our patent jurisprudence.
To point out a disease without attempting to prescribe a
remedy is as profitless in legal as in medical or moral science. In
concluding this paper I therefore venture to suggest certain lines
of conduct which, in my view, a sound conservatism would dictate
as the most efficacious modes of restoring and perpetuating the
integrity arid consistency of our patent law.
i. A legislative revision of the written law, in which each
subdivision of the subject shall be separately treated with such
completeness as if it had no relations with any other subdivision,
and every rule shall be expressed in words with all its limitations.
This is practicable in patent law even if it is so in no other branch
of jurisprudence, and would abolish that convenient but destruc-
tive method of escaping difficulties by discovering some new
interpretation of the statutes which their ellipses and confused
arrangement now render possible.
2. The abandonment by the courts of the present habit of
departing from the points submitted to their judgment in order to
discourse on general topics which, though related to the facts
before them, raise no issue of law for their decision; and when
explaining and fortifying their own judgments to urge only those
reasons which they have had the time and opportunity to thor-
oughly investigate both in their fidelity to principle and in their
bearing on all possible states of fact. A decision for which no
reasons are adduced, if right as most of the decisions in patent
cases unquestionably are, advances the science of the law to the
extent of that decision. But a correct judgment for which untrue
or illogical reasons are presented works mischief in two ways.
To critical students, having already a competent knowledge of the
law, the force of the judgment is impaired by the manifest weak-
ness of the reasons which support it; while the careless and
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ill-informed accept the judgment and the reasons both as sound
and are by both misled.
3. The refusal of advocates to maintain before the courts any
legal proposition of whose correctness they have not satisfied
themselves by sufficient study, unbiassed by the exigencies of the
case in which they are engaged. This remedy touches the evil at
its root. Of all the erroneous propositions scattered up and down
through the pages of our reports there are probably very few
which were not first conceived and formulated in the brain of
some partisan advocate whose purposes it suited to have the law
thus perverted and misapplied. An overburdened judge,
tmfamiliar with the facts and sometimes with the principles of law
involved in the case before him, is not always proof against the
specious arguments by which false doctrines may be clothed in the
habiliments of truth; and though the courts must undergo the
odium of their errors and mistakes, yet with the members of the
bar lies in most cases the greater blame. Fortunately with them
also lies the remedy. They have the power, if they see fit to use
it, to return the patent law to its ancient channels, to purify it of
its errors, to bring it back in all its details into complete harmony
with principles, and to hand it down to their successors the simple,
consistent, and beneficial system which it was when they received
Cit.
William C. Robinson.
